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THE CREDIT CARD MARKET AND REGULATION:
IN NEED OF REPAIR'




This paper was originally one part of comprehensive comments
submitted by the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) to the Federal
Reserve Board. The comments were submitted on behalf of the low
income clients of the National Consumer Law Center, a variety of other
national advocacy groups, and individual members of the Board's
Consumer Advisory Council.' These national organizations and
I.This paper was originally one section of comprehensive comments filed by the
National Consumer Law Center on behalf of its low-income clients, with the Federal
Reserve Board in response to its Advance Notice of Public Rulemaking, Docket No. R-
1217, relating a review of the open end credit rules of Regulation Z.
2. All authors are attorneys with the National Consumer Law Center. The National
Consumer Law Center, Inc. (NCLC) is a non-profit Massachusetts corporation, founded in
1969, specializing in low-income consumer issues, with an emphasis on consumer credit.
See, National Consumer Law Center, http://www.consumerlaw.org (last visited Jan. 14,
2006). On a daily basis, NCLC provides legal and technical consulting and assistance on
consumer law issues to legal services, government, and private attorneys representing low-
income consumers across the country. NCLC publishes a series of sixteen practice treatises
and annual supplements on consumer credit laws, including Truth In Lending, (5th ed.
2003) and Cost of Credit (2nd ed. 2000) and Repossessions and Foreclosures (5th ed. 2002)
as well as bimonthly newsletters on a range of topics related to consumer credit issues and
low-income consumers. NCLC's attorneys have written and advocated extensively on all
aspects of consumer law affecting low income people, conducted training for tens of
thousands of legal services and private attorneys on the law and litigation strategies to deal
predatory lending and other consumer law problems, and provided extensive oral and
written testimony to numerous Congressional committees on these topics. NCLC's attorneys
have been closely involved with the enactment of the all federal laws affecting consumer
credit since the 1970s, and regularly provide comprehensive comments to the federal
agencies on the regulations under these laws.
3. The Center for Consumer Affairs is part of the School of Continuing Education at
the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee.
The Consumer Federation of America is a non-profit association of 300 organizations that,
since 1968, has sought to advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy and
education.
Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer Reports magazine, is an
organization created to provide consumers with information, education and counsel about
goods, services, health, and personal finance and to initiate and cooperate with individual
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individuals collectively represent a broad swath of American low- and
middle-income consumers.
The Federal Reserve Board's ("the Board") thorough review of
the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") 4 rules applicable to open-end credit
is of considerable magnitude, as this federal law essentially comprises
the only restraints on the financial services industry in the open-end
credit relationship with consumers. This review of TILA highlights the
Board's mandate "to protect consumers against inaccurate and unfair
credit bill and credit card practices, ' to propose meaningful changes to
the TILA regulations, and to recommend to Congress significant
changes in federal law to protect consumers from the escalating abusive
practices of the credit card industry.
The Board must recognize the unique position it occupies at this
crossroads for consumer protection. The virtually unregulated credit
card industry - responsible for the $730 billion in credit card debt
currently owed by American households - must be reined in. The
amount of credit card debt juggled by a majority of American
households has exploded in the past decade - much of it fueled by
business practices that are often deceptive and abusive.6
and group efforts to maintain and enhance the quality of life for consumers. ConsumersUnion's income is solely derived from the sale of Consumer Reports, its other publications
and from noncommercial contributions, grants and fees. Consumers Union's publications
carry no advertising and receive no commercial support.
Damos is a non-partisan, national public policy organization based in New York. Our work
centers on expanding economic opportunity and creating a more robust democracy.
The National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA) is a non-profit corporation
whose members are private and public sector attorneys, legal services attorneys, lawprofessors, and law students, whose primary focus involves the protection and
representation of consumers. NACA's mission is to promote justice for all consumers.
The U.S. Public Interest Research Group is the national lobbying office for state PIRGs,
which are non-profit, non-partisan consumer advocacy groups with half a million citizen
members around the country.
The Woodstock Institute is a Chicago-based nonprofit research organization dedicated topromoting community reinvestment, credit access, and sound financial services amonglower-income and minority neighborhoods both locally and nationally. For over thirtyyears, Woodstock has supported legislation and regulation in the best interest of low-income
consumers. Woodstock also convenes the Chicago CRA Coalition, a group of nearly 100
area organizations with an interest in promoting reinvestment in underserved communities.
Diane Thompson, Member of the Federal Reserve Board's Consumer Advisory Board.
Sheila Canavan, Member of the Federal Reserve Board's Consumer Advisory Board.
4. Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 226, Docket No. R-1217 (2004).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
6. See infra notes 32-91 and accompanying text.
CREDIT CARD REGULATION
The Board has a variety of choices. One - perhaps the easiest -
would be to simply tweak the TILA regulations for open-end credit,
essentially maintaining the current uneven playing field between a
giant, well financed credit industry and individual consumers. Two -
the preferred option - the Board could make serious changes in the
regulations as currently permitted by the TILA to provide some balance
to the regulatory structure. This would include encouraging Congress to
make more significant changes to federal law to protect individual
consumers, facilitate the reduction in debt in overburdened households,
and increase family savings. Three - the Board could bow to heavy
pressures from the consumer credit industry and make an already
intolerable situation for American consumers much worse, by reducing
open-end protections under TILA.
The Board should seize this opportunity to push the envelope on
regulatory changes under TILA's open-end rules and comprehensively
propose disclosure reforms that recognize TILA's unique control over
open-end credit in this nation, especially considering the fact that
consumers need the Board to exercise this control in a much more
proactive way. Along with these regulatory changes, the Board must
also strongly encourage Congress to pass substantive federal legislation
that will protect American consumers from the increasingly unfair,
abusive, and virtually unavoidable practices of the credit card industry.
Given the preemption of state laws applicable to open-end credit
provided by most financial institutions and the huge difference in
bargaining power between consumers and the credit card industry, even
perfect disclosures will not adequately protect consumers.
7
This paper first builds a case for significant improvement to all
of the rules applicable to open-end credit. Second, the paper outlines
the improvements to federal law that the Board should recommend to
Congress to provide substantive protections to consumers. Finally, the
paper recommends a series of specific and necessary changes to TILA's
regulations to address some of the extensive problems we describe. The
paper is divided into four sections. Section II of this paper discusses
escalating credit card debt and how this escalating debt is hurting
consumers. Section III of the paper discusses the abuses perpetrated by
the credit card companies and how these abuses are proliferating.
7. See infra Part IV.
2006]
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Section IV of the paper states that the system is broken and discusses
how improved disclosures will not address the substantive problems.
Section V concludes the paper, presenting recommendations for
statutory reform.
II. ESCALATING CREDIT CARD DEBT Is HURTING CONSUMERS
The use of open-end credit is pervasive in American society.
Credit cards have become an increasingly integral part of our lives.
Three-quarters of all households have at least one credit card, and over
half of cardholders carry credit card debt from month to month.8 There
are now almost 1.5 billion cards in circulation - over a dozen credit
cards for every household in the country.9 The amount of credit card
debt outstanding at the end of 2004 was $781.1 billion,'0 over three
times more than existed in 1993."
While the explosion of credit card debt has fueled the U.S.
economy, 2 it has also had devastating impacts on millions of American
consumers. Americans across all but the lowest income levels have
8. See, Ana M. Aizcorbe, et al., Fed. Reserve Bd., Recent Changes in U.S. FamilyFinances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES.BULL., Jan. 2003, at 25, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin
/2003/0103lead.pdf.
9. See, U.S. Census Bureau, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at751, No. 1190: Credit Cards - Holders, Numbers, Spending, and Debt, 1990 and 2000, andProjects, 2005, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/banking.pdf,
U.S. Census Bureau, Projections of the Number of Households and Families in the UnitedStates: 1995 to 2010 at 9 (1996), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/I/pop/p25-
1 129.pdf (projecting 108.8 million households by 2005).
10. Statistical Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/Current/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2006); see also, Consumer Federation ofAmerica, Credit Card Issuers Expand Marketing and Available Credit, ConsumersIncreasingly Say No, (2002), available at http://www.consunerfed.org/081492
bankruptcycredit card report_02_2.txt (citing data from the Federal Reserve Board andVeribanc, Inc. showing there was $701 billion in outstanding credit card debt at the end of
the first quarter of 2002).
11. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., D.C., FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE GRAPHBOOK, (Dec. 31, 1997), available at http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/1997dec/grbook/QBPGR.pdf(charting $153.4 billion in credit card loans to consumers at the end of 1993); see alsoOffice of the Comptroller of the Currency, Advisory Letter, 96-7 (Sept. 26, 1996), available
at http://www.occ.gov/ftp/advisory/96-7.txt.
12. Patrick McGeehan, The Plastic Trap-Debt That Binds: Soaring InterestCompounds Credit Card Pain for Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at I ("[R]egulators
and lawmakers have been reluctant to crack down on a popular consumer product that fuelsAmerica's economic engine. Consumer spending pulled the country through the lasteconomic downturn, powered largely by purchases financed with debt, to the tune of $2
trillion.").
CREDIT CARD REGULATION
experienced dramatically increased credit card debt over the past ten
years:
* "Between 1989 and 2001 credit card debt in America almost
tripled from $238 billion to $692 billion. Worse, the savings
rate steadily declined and the number of personal
bankruptcies filed climbed 125%.'
3
* "Credit card debt among older Americans with incomes
under $50,000 (seventy percent of seniors) has also
increased. About one in five older families with credit card
debt is in debt hardship - spending over forty percent of
their income on debt payments, including mortgage 
debt."' 4
* The average credit card debt among young adults increased
by fifty-five percent between 1992 and 2001 to $4,088
dollars, and these households now spend nearly twenty-four
percent of their income on debt payments. In fact, among
these young households with incomes below $50,000,
"nearly one in five with credit card debt is in debt hardship -
spending over forty percent of their income servicing debt
(including mortgages and student loans)."' 5
* The average credit card-indebted family member between
fifty and sixty-four now spends one-third of their income on
debt payments, "a ten percentage point increase over the
decade."'6
The negative consequences of this escalating mountain of debt
on individual consumers as well as the American economy cannot be
overstated. Personal bankruptcy rates are increasing on an annual
basis, 7 and families are becoming destabilized due to the financial
pressures.'8
13. TAMARA DRAuT & JAVIER SILVA, DEMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: 
THE
GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE '90s at 9 (2003), available at http://www.demos-
usa.org/pubs/borrowingto makeends meet.pdf.
14. HEATHER G. MCGEE & TAMARA DRAUT, DEMOS, RETIRING IN THE RED: 
THE
GROWTH OF DEBT AMONG OLDER AMERICANS 1 (2004), available at http://www.demos-
usa.org/publ01.cfm.
15. TAMARA DRAuT & JAVIER SILVA, DEMOS, THE GROWTH OF DEBT AMONG YOUNG
AMERICANS 1 (2004), available at http://www.demos-usa.org/pub295.cffL-
16. DRAUT & MCGEE, supra note 14.
17. The number of personal bankruptcy filings has increased steadily since TILA was
2006]
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A. Escalating Debt Loads Are Caused By Industry Practices
A significant amount of the debt load facing American
households is caused not so much by consumer borrowing, but by the
harsh - and exorbitantly expensive - tactics of the credit card industry.' 9
Generally consumers struggle to "do the honorable thing" and meet
their obligations and pay their creditors, yet most consumers in debt
trouble fail to appreciate that credit card companies will not take steps
to facilitate the pay off of these debts.20 These issuers often act as if
they intend to keep consumers on this treadmill of debt, paying fees and
charges, for as long as possible.2 ' Credit card debt has caught millions
of households in a trap they simply cannot extricate themselves from
without feeling the pressure to file bankruptcy.2
Even still, credit card companies make huge profits even on
consumers who file bankruptcy. Consider the following case about a
consumer from Cleveland, Ohio, who did play by the rules, but who
was driven hopelessly into default by her credit card company.
B. Six- Year Struggle to Repay Debt - A Story of Unending Fee 2 3
In May 1997, Ruth Owens stopped using her credit card,
made no further purchases or cash advances, and tried to
pay off her debt to Discover Bank. At that time, she
owed $1,963. Over the next six years, Ms. Owens made
$3,492 in payments to Discover Bank. One might
assume this was enough to pay off her debt. After all, if
Ms. Owens had made the same payments on a $2,000
loan with interest at twenty-one percent annual
enacted in 1968, reaching 1,624,272 in 2004. Cf, News Release, Adm. Office of the U.S.Courts, Number of Bankruptcy Cases Filed in Federal Courts Down Less Than One Percent(Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press Releases/june04bk.pdfPersonal bankruptcy filings declined by a small number, 13,111, between 2003 and 200418. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP (Basic
Books 2003).
19. See infra notes 32-92 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 23-30, 39-64, 69-92 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 32-92 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. The National Consumer Law Center examined this case study. See Press Release,The Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr, Responsible Consumers Driven into Default (Feb. 22, 2005),http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/bankruptcy/releasedefault.shtml.
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percentage rate (the usury limit in many states), her debt
would [have been] paid off.
From May 1997 until her account was sent for collection
in May 2003, not one penny of Ms. Owens' $3,492 in
payments went to reduce her debt. During this time,
Discover Bank charged Ms. Owens various fees that
[consumed] all of her payments and caused her debt to
grow even larger. The following fees and interest were
charged to Ms. Owens' account:
Fees and Interest
Over-limit Fees $ 1,518.00
Late Fees $1,160.00
Credit Insurance (CreditSafe)24  $ 369.62
Interest and Other Fees $ 6,008.66
Total $ 9,056.28
So, despite having received substantial payments for six
years from Ms. Owens (all that she could really afford),
Discover Bank claimed that she still owed $5,564 when
[it] filed a collection lawsuit against her in an Ohio
court.
In other words,
[A]fter having paid $3,492 on a $1,963 debt, Ms.
Owens' balance grew to $5,564.
Card companies make huge profits off customers like
24. Like many card customers, Ms. Owens was being charged for one of the numerous
insurance-like products sold by card companies. Often, these products are sold through
high-pressure telemarketing sales. In this case, Ms. Owens was charged approximately $10
per month for a Discover card product called CreditSafe Plus, which apparently provided for
a suspension of payments and finance charges if Ms. Owens became unemployed,
hospitalized, or disabled. Since Ms. Owens was already on Social Security Disability and
unemployed, the CreditSafe product presumably would apply only if she became
hospitalized. Ms. Owens was no doubt paying for a product that would likely never benefit
her. Id.
2006]
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Ms. Owens. Rather than work with these consumers to
reduce their debt by curbing the excess fees and interest,
card companies prefer to get as much out of consumers
for as long as possible until they eventually stop paying
or file bankruptcy.
In this case, Ms. Owens would have been far better off if
she simply stopped paying Discover Bank years earlier
and had them sue her in state court. If Discover Bank
had [obtained] a court judgment for $2,000, all of the
card fees and high-rate interest would have stopped and
Discover would have then been entitled to 10% or less
interest per year under Ohio law. Rather than have her
debt increase, Ms. Owens' payments would have paid
off the debt in full in approximately 4 years.25
When Discover Card finally sued Ms. Owens in state court, she
submitted the following handwritten statement to the court:
I would like to inform you that I have no money to make
payments. I am on Social Security Disability. After
paying my monthly utilities, there is no money left
except a little food money and sometimes it isn't
enough. If my situation was different I would pay. I just
don't have it. I'm sorry.2 6
The Ohio judge assigned to the collection case rightly found that
Ms. Owens was not a deadbeat. He stated that her
instincts were always that she wanted to plug away at
meeting her financial obligations. While clearly placing
her on the moral high road, that same highway
unfortunately was her road to financial ruin. How is it
that the person who wants to do right ends up so worse
25. Responsible Consumers Driven Into Default, supra note 23.
26. Id.
[Vol. 10
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off? It is plain to the court that the creditor also bears
some responsibility.
27
In barring Discover Card from collecting any more money from
Ms. Owens, the Ohio judge stated: "This court is all too aware of the
widespread financial exploitation of the urban poor by overbearing
credit-card companies. [Ms. Owens] has clearly been the victim of
plaintiff's unreasonable, unconscionable and unjust business
,,21practices.
C. Credit Card Companies Enjoy Growing Profits
"Credit card earnings have been consistently higher than returns
on all [other] commercial bank activities., 29 According to a Board
Report, profitability increases reached 13.7% in 2003 when the credit
card banks included in the sample were held constant.30 When the cost
27. Discover Bank v. Owens, 822 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ohio Mun. 2004); see also infra
note 31 and accompanying text.
28. Discover Bank, 822 N.E.2d at 875. Another example is the bankruptcy case of
Josephine McCarthy from the Eastern District of Virginia (In re McCarthy, No. 04-10493-
SSM (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed July 14, 2004)), which also illustrates how consumers are
routinely subjected to compounding fees and escalating interest charges, combined with
unilateral changes to the terms of credit, and other abusive practices. The exhibits to the
decision include two accounts the debtor had with one credit card company.
On one account, the debtor made $3,058 in payments over a two year period during which
her balance on the account increased from $4,888 to $5,357. She had made only made only
$218.16 (net of store credit) in purchases during this time. All of her payments went to pay
finance charges (at a 29.99% interest rate), late charges, over-limit fees, bad check fees, and
phone payment fees. On the other card, she made $2,008 in payments over the same period
and the account balance increased from $2,020.90 to $2,607.66. This time she made all of
$203.06 in purchases.
Total Payments Purchases Balance Total Interest
Increase and Fees in 2
year period.
Account 1 $3,058.00 $218.16 $469.00 $3,308.84
Account 2 $2008.00 $203.06 $586.76 $2,391.79
In re Josephine McCarthy, No. 04-10493-SSM (Bankr. E.D. Va. filed 2004).
29. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE PROFITABILITY OF
CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (June 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2004/ccprofit.pdf. While
the profitability of the credit card banks as a whole has fluctuated somewhat over these
years, this is largely due to the changeability of the group of banks included in the sample.
Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 4.
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of funds declines for the banks, the profit margins stay high; when the
cost of funds increases, these expenses are passed along to consumers.
Even when all other economic indicators are problematic, credit card
companies experience increased profits.3 The problem is not that these
companies are making huge profits - the problem is simply that these
profits are acquired by employing abusive practices, and through the
process American households are being seriously harmed.32 The root of
these problems is that open-end credit in this nation is now completely
unregulated - and this must change.
III. ABUSES BY CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ARE PROLIFERATING
Credit card abuses are not limited to one or a handful of
practices. Instead, card issuers have devised a myriad of schemes and
traps to squeeze consumers, particularly consumers who are carrying
heavy debt loads or beginning to exhibit signs of financial distress.
Furthermore, it is not just one or a handful of credit card companies that
engage in abusive practices, but a great number of the top ten credit card
issuers." This pattern of heavy-handed and manipulative conduct by an
entire industry shows that credit card issuers have altered their
fundamental treatment of consumers from a fair, respectful business
relationship to an abusive, exploitative one.
Credit card companies were not always so free to engage in such
abusive behavior. Credit card deregulation, and the concomitant
spiraling credit card debt of Americans, began in 1978, with the
Supreme Court's decision in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis
v. First of Omaha Service Corp.3 4 This case gave national banks the
green light to take the most favored lender status from their home state
across state lines and preempt the law of the borrower's home state.35
31. See Lavonne Kuykendall, Review 2004: Card Lenders Earned More Despite Weak
Portfolio Growth, AMERICAN BANKER, Jan. 3, 2005, at 1.
32. See infra notes 32-85 and accompanying text.
33. Cf., e.g., Press Release, Minn. Attorney Gen.'s Office, Attorney General Sues
Capital One Over Advertising Practices (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.ag.state.mn/us/consumer/PR/PR_041230CapitalOneBank FSB.htm
(announcing suit against Capital One); U.S. PIRG, Credit Card Lawsuits, http://www.
pirg.org/consumer/bankrupt/bankrupt2.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2006) (describing the civil
penalties assessed against Providian and other issuers).
34. Cf. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn. v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
301 (1978).
35. It is worth noting that there was no interstate banking when the National Bank Act
[Vol. 10
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As a result, national banks and other depositories established their
headquarters in states that eliminated or raised their usury limits, giving
them free rein to charge whatever interest rate they wanted.
36 Therein
lies the reason why so many of those credit card solicitations sent by
mail every week come from Delaware or South Dakota: credit card
issuers moved there to export those unregulated states' lack of
consumer protections nationwide.37 As of 1978, credit card debt had
grown to $50 billion, up from just $5.3 billion when the TILA was
passed.38
A. Punitive Junk Fees
A contributor to the snowballing credit card debt of American
consumers is the increase in both the number and amount of non-
periodic interest fees charged by credit card issuers. These "junk" fees
include both fees considered finance charges (cash advance, balance
transfer fees, wire transfer fees) and non-finance charges ("other"
fees).3 9 Most important among the latter are late payment and over-
limit fees. See Chart 1 showing the increase in fee income from these
was passed.
36. Other depository institutions obtained the same most favored lender status when
Congress enacted § 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831(d) (2000)).
37. South Dakota and Delaware, at the beginning of the explosive growth of the
financial services industry around 1980, sought to attract that industry as part of their
economic development strategy. They wanted to "provide [their] citizens with the jobs and
benefits a large national credit card operation can provide (attracted by the ability to export
limitless credit card rates to other states)," while, it should be noted, protecting their local
banks from competition with the exporting banks. Indep. Cmty. Bankers' Ass'n of S.D. v.
Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 838 F.2d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 1988); cf. Richard
Eckman, Recent Usury Law Developments: The Delaware Consumer Credit Bank Act and
"Exporting" Interest Under Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary ControlAct of 1980, 39 Bus. LAW. 1251, 1265 (1984).
It worked, too. South Dakota's tax revenue from banks went from $3.2 million in 1980 to
almost $27.2 million in 1987, with the comparable figures for Delaware rising from $2.4
million to almost $40 million. Small Us Usurious, THE EcONOMIST, July 2, 1988, at 26.
38. Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card
Volumes, Charge-Offs, and in the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, FDIC - Division of Insurance,
Bank Trends, 98-05 (Mar. 1998) http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt_9805.html.
39. Cf Sample Letter to Federal Reserve Board on Credit Card Practices, The National
Consumer Law Center, available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/test and-comm
/031805 cc sampcomm.shtml ("It is the current exceptions and loopholes in Regulation Z
that permit junk fees to escape disclosure as a finance charge and in the effective APR.").
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two fees alone. Credit card issuers have made these fees higher in
amount, impose them more quickly, and assess them more often.4"









1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Years
-4-Average over-imi fees -*-Average late fees
Chart 1
Sources: Over-limit Fees, The U.S. Payment Card Information Network Website, Mar. 4,
2005, http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/2005/february/ 2a.html; Late Fees, The U.S.
Payment Card Information Network Website, Mar. 4, 2005, http://www.cardweb.com
/cardtrak/news/2005/j anuary/28a.html.
40. Id. ("Credit card lenders have rushed to increase junk fees since the fees were
deregulated in 1996, jacking up late payment and over-limit fees from an average of $14 to
over $30. They have been quick to impose these fees for even transgressions of a single
day. They have created traps for unwary consumers with early morning cut-off times for
payment.").
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From 1978 to 1995, credit card debt increased six-fold to $378
billion.4' In 1996, the Supreme Court paved the way for credit card
banks to increase their income stream even more dramatically. In
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., the court approved of the
Office of Comptroller of Currency's ("OCC") definition of interest that
included a number of credit card charges, such as late payment, over-
limit, cash advance, returned check, annual, and membership fees.
42 As
a result, national banks and other depositories can charge fees in any
amount to their customers as long as their home-state laws permit the
fees and so long as the fees are "interest" under the OCC definition.
Uncapping the amount of fees that credit card banks can charge
nationwide has resulted in the rapid growth of and reliance on fee
income by credit card issuers.
After Smiley, banks rushed to increase late charges, over-limit
fees, and other charges. The average late payment fee has soared from
fourteen dollars in 1996 to over thirty-two dollars in 2004.41 Over-limit
fees have similarly jumped from fourteen dollars in 1996 to over thirty
dollars in 2004.44
Now banks impose these fees, not as a way to curb undesirable
behavior from consumers - which used to be the primary justification
for imposing high penalties - but as a significant source of revenue for
the bank. Since Smiley, penalty fee revenue has increased nearly nine-
fold from $1.7 billion in 1996 to $14.8 billion in 2004.4' The income
from just three fees - penalty fees, cash advance fees and annual fees -
reached $24.4 billion in 2004.46 Fee income topped $30 billion if
balance transfer fees, foreign exchange, and other fees are added to this
41. See, Fed. Reserve Bd., Consumer Credit Historical Data: Not Seasonally Adjusted-
Major Types of Credit, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g 19/hist/cc hist mt.txt.
42. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,740-47 (1996). The OCC definition
of interest is found in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (2004).
43. Cardweb.com, Tracking Bank Credit & Payment Cards for the American
Consumer: Late Fees (Jan. 28, 2005), http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/
2 0 05
/january/28a.html.
44. Cardweb.com, Tracking Bank Credit & Payment Cards for the American
Consumer: Overlimit Fees (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/
2 0 05/
february/2a.html.
45. Cardweb.com, Tracking Bank Credit & Payment Cards for the American
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total.47 Concurrently, card issuer profits, though declining somewhat
between 1995 to 1998, have steadily increased between 1999 and 2004.
These profits rose from 3.1% in 1999 to 4.5% in 2004.48
Not only has the size of fee income for credit card issuers grown
enormously, the types of fees have mushroomed as well. The Board
provides a list of fees to consumers in a brochure titled "Choosing a
Credit Card., 49  The most common fees incurred in credit card
transactions include:
NAME OF FEE DESCRIPTION OF FEE
Annual fee (sometimes billed Charged for having the card. Fees
monthly). range from zero to $130.
Cash advance fee. Charged when the card is used to
obtain a cash advance; the fee is
usually 3% of the advance, with a
minimum of $5 and no maximum.
Balance-transfer fee. Charged when the consumer
transfers a balance from another
credit card. Fees range from 2% to
3% of the amount transferred, with
a minimum.
Late-payment fee. Charged if the consumer'spayment is received after the due
date. Fees range from $10 to $49.
Over-the-credit-limit fee. Charged if the consumer goes overthe credit limit. Fees range from
$10 to $39.
Credit-limit-increase fee. Charged if the consumer asks for
an increase in her/his credit limit.
Set-up fee. One-time fee, charged when a new
credit card account is opened.
Return-item fee. Charged if the consumer pays the
bill by check and the check is
returned for non-sufficient funds.
47. Id. If merchant-paid fees are combined with consumer-paid fees, the total fee
income is estimated at $50.8 billion.
48. Cardweb.com, Tracking Bank Credit & Payment Cards for the American
Consumer: Card Profits 04, (Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/news/2005/
january/24a.html.
49. Federal Reserve Board, Choosing a Credit Card, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/shop (last visited March 22, 2005).
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Expedited payment fee. Charged when the consumer makes
a payment over the phone. Fees
range from $10 to $14.95.
Expedited delivery fee. Charged when the consumer
requests an additional credit card
and requests that it be delivered in
an expedited way.
Replacement cardfee. Charged when the consumer's
credit card is lost, stolen, damaged,
or otherwise needs to be replaced.
Additional card fee. Charged when the consumer
requests a card for a family
member or otherwise wishes an
additional card.
Other fees. Some credit card companies charge
a fee to cover the costs of reporting
to credit bureaus, reviewing the
consumer's account, or providing
other customer services.
The problem with these punitive charges, especially in
combination with the penalty interest rates, is that they exacerbate the
problems of consumers who have hit hard times. Too often these
charges drive consumers into bankruptcy, resulting in cascading losses
to individuals, families and neighborhoods-lost savings, lost homes,
and forced moves, with all of the consequential financial and emotional
tolls.
In the example of Ruth Owens discussed above, $2,678 of her
credit card debt was attributable to late fees and over-limit fees alone.
Bankruptcy decisions shed further light on how high finance charges
and junk fees, not irresponsible spending, may be the root cause of
overwhelming credit card debt. In one proceeding, a bankruptcy court
forced Capital One to break out principal versus interest and fees in its
claims against thirty-one separate debtors. The bankruptcy court's
order reveals that on average, fifty-seven percent of the debts consisted
of interest and fees.50
50. Amended Order Overruling Objection to Claims, In re Blair (W.D.N.C. Feb. 10,
2004).
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Some problems with specific fees include:
1. Balance transfer fees. Balance transfer fees can be insidious
because they often involve consumers who have been carrying a large
balance from month to month. Credit card issuers lure these consumers
into transferring large balances by heavily advertising low or 0% APRs,
but not disclosing the balance transfer fee as prominently. For example,
the MBNA card solicitation at Attachment 1 trumpets a "low 2.9%
Fixed APR" for balance transfers using large type, repeating the 2.9%
APR several times. It only discloses the balance transfer fee of three
percent on the reverse page in eight-point type.51 Thus, a consumer
transferring a balance of $2,000 would be charged a sixty dollar fee. As
a result of this balance transfer, this consumer would add more to her
debt burden, although MBNA's advertising would have led her to
believe that a balance transfer would save her money.
2. Currency conversion fees. Currency conversion fees
constitute a double whammy, in that they are imposed twice in many
cases - once by the card issuer and once by the MasterCard or VISA
network. These fees were previously hidden by deceptively "padding"
the exchange rate, i.e., giving the consumer a worse exchange rate than
that obtained by the card issuer.52
3. Late payment fees. Issuers have moved even faster to impose
late payment fees. Previously, credit card issuers gave consumers a
leniency period of a few days before imposing late fees.53 Now, card
issuers will impose late fees if the consumer is even one day over the
due date. In fact, some issuers have imposed late fees for payments
received on the payment due date but after a certain cut-off time, a
practice discussed more fully in the next section on abusive practices.
4. Over-limit fees. Over-limit fees are particularly unfair
because the card issuer technologically has the ability to decline over-
limit transactions but chooses to permit them and then reap penalty fee
income. Card issuers have also been known to lower customers' credit
51. Credit Card solicitation (on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal).
52. See generally, In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 265 F. Supp.2d
385, 394 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
53. The Role of FCRA in the Credit Granting Process: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 108 th
Cong. at 7 (2003) (statement of Dr. Robert D. Manning, Caroline Werner Gannett Professor




limits during the middle of the billing cycle, then charge over-limit fees
when unsuspecting consumers exceed the new limit at the end of the
cycle.54
B. Other Abusive Practices
Credit card companies use a variety of means to lure
unsuspecting consumers into the trap of financial exploitation created
by exorbitant interest and fees. Even cautious consumers, who are
attempting to manage their personal finances wisely, too often find
themselves caught up in the web of deception and abusive practices.
1. Penalty Rates and Universal Default
A penalty rate is an increase in the initial APR triggered by the
occurrence of a specific event, such as the consumer's making a late
payment or exceeding the credit limit. These penalty interest rates can
be as high as thirty percent to forty percent.55 The new terms apply to
the old balance - leaving consumers stuck to pay often high balances at
interest rates far higher than was originally agreed, with devastating
consequences.56
The existence of penalty rates for minor transgressions alone
would be enough to draw criticism by consumer advocates. Raising an
APR from the mid-teens to thirty percent or higher, simply on the basis
of a single transgression, is itself unjustified and unfair. After all, the
card issuer has already collected a one-time charge for that late payment
or over-limit transaction, which probably more than covers its costs.
Increasing the consumer's APR is simply a way for the card issuer to
reap additional profit by playing gotcha with unsuspecting consumers -
if a consumer trips once, the company then imposes sky-high rates.
54. See Complaint at 14, State of Minnesota v. Capital One Bank, available at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/PR/CapitalOneComplaint.pdf.
55. See Kathleen Day & Caroline Mayer, Credit Card, Fees Bury Debtors; Senate
Nears Action on Bankruptcy Curbs, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at Al.
56. "Penalty interest rates usually are about 30 percent, with some as high as 40
percent, while late fees now often are $39 a month, and over-limit fees, about $35."
According to Robert McKinley, CEO of Cardweb, "[i]f you drag that out for a year, it could
be very damaging .... Late and over-limit fees alone can easily rack up $900 in fees, and a
30 percent interest rate on a $3,000 balance can add another $1,000, so you could go from
$2,000 to $5,000 in just one year if you fail to make payments." See id.
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This practice is particularly problematic when it is applied
retroactively. There is simply no legal or economic justification for
retroactively assessing a penalty interest rate to an existing balance. No
other industry in the country is allowed to increase the price of a
product once it is purchased. Issuers have already assessed a
consumer's risk of not repaying the loan and presumably offered an
interest rate based on that risk. Issuers should be required to allow a
consumer to pay off his or her existing balance at that interest rate.
Card issuers have recently added insult to injury with the notion
of "universal default," the latest tactic to squeeze every drop of revenue
from struggling consumers.57 With universal default, credit card issuers
impose penalty rates on consumers, not for late payments or any
behavior with respect to the consumer's account with that particular
issuer, but for late payments to any of the consumer's other creditors. 58
In some cases, issuers will impose penalties simply if the credit score
drops below a certain number, whether or not the drop was due to a late
payment or another factor.59 A survey of credit card issuers found that
forty-four percent of banks surveyed had a universal default policy.60
An analysis of recent credit card solicitations shows that credit
card issuers have been disclosing universal default policies in a less than
prominent or understandable manner. These solicitations typically
state:
All your APRs may increase if you default under any
Card Agreement that you have with us because you fail
to make a payment to us or any other creditor when due,
you exceed your credit line, or you make a payment to
us that is not honored.
57. See Robert K. Heady, 'Universal Default' Traps Consumers who Pay Late,




59. See Patrick McGeehan, Plastic Trap-Debt That Binds: Soaring Interest
Compounds Credit Card Pain for Millions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, § 1, at 1; Complaint
at 14, supra note 54. The New York Times article was the companion piece to the PBS
Frontline television episode The Secret History of the Credit Card, (PBS Frontline broadcast
Nov. 23, 2004), which focused on among other issues, universal default and change-in-
terms.




These disclosures are usually outside the required TILA
disclosures highlighted in the Schumer box,6 1 sometimes in smaller
type, and cross-referenced to the penalty rate as a footnote. While these
solicitations mention briefly that a late payment to "any other" creditor
will trigger a penalty rate, none of the solicitations disclosed that a mere
drop in credit score may be the trigger. This is problematic because a
drop in credit score is not always caused by late payments - it could be
caused by having an unfavorable balance/limit ratio (sometimes a
"utilization" greater than fifty percent, is enough to cause a score
decline) on revolving accounts, an excessive number of inquiries, or a
number of other factors that have little to do with the consumer's ability
or willingness tr repay the credit.62
The solution to this problem, however, is not simply better
disclosure. It is fundamentally unfair to impose a penalty rate on a
consumer who has not made a late payment or defaulted on the
obligation, especially when this rate increase is applied retroactively.
Another concern with using credit reports to trigger a penalty rate is the
enormous problem with inaccuracies in credit scoring and credit
reporting. A review of over 500,000 consumer credit files by the
Consumer Federation of America and the National Credit Reporting
Association found that twenty-nine percent of consumers have credit
scores that differ by at least fifty points between credit bureaus, while
four percent have scores that differ by at least 100 points.63 Other
studies have found that between fifty to seventy percent of credit reports
contain inaccurate information. 64
61. The Schumer box is the box that contains the required TILA disclosures like APR,
amount financed, etc.
62. See Myfico, What's In Your Score?, www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/Whats
InYourScore.aspx?fire=5 (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
63. CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA AND NATIONAL CREDIT REPORTING
ASSOCIATION, CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS at 17-24 (Dec.
17, 2002), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/121702CFANCRACredit-
ScoreReportFinal.pdf.
64. U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, MISTAKES Do HAPPEN: CREDIT REPORT
ERRORS MEAN CONSUMERS LOSE (1998), available at http://uspirg.org/reports/
mistakesdohappen3 98.pdf; Consumer Reports, Credit Reports: How Do Potential Lenders
See You?, at 52-53 (July 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute Journal).
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2. Deceptive Marketing
Some card issuers have engaged in questionable marketing
practices when soliciting consumers. "Bait and switch" tactics are
common. For example, card issuers have marketed "no annual fee"
credit cards, then imposed an annual fee six months later using a
change-in-terms notice.65 They heavily advertise low "fixed" rates, but
subsequently raise rates through change-in-terms notices and use
penalty fees with punitive late payment and over-limit policies to
subsequently entrap consumers.66
Another deceptive practice is that of "downselling" consumers
by prominently marketing one package of credit terms, but then
approving consumers only for accounts with less favorable terms, and
touting the approved account in a fashion designed to mislead the
customer about the fact that the received card is more expensive. 67
Moreover, any discussion of deceptive marketing is almost
secondary given the existence of expansive change-in-terms provisions.
Avoiding bait and switch abuse would require that advertising honestly
reflect the terms of the credit card contract. If these terms can be
changed at will by card issuers with a mere fifteen day notice, no
amount of honesty in advertising will help consumers because the
advertising will only reflect the terms of the contract at that moment and
cannot reflect future changes by issuers.
3. Payment Allocation Order
Many credit card companies heavily advertise low APRs in their
solicitations that are only applicable to one category of transactions.
They then allocate payments first to the balances with lower APRs.
According to cases, the disclosure of payment allocation order has been
65. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat'l. Assn., 280 F.3d 384, 387-88 (3d Cir. 2002).
66. See Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I), Nat'l Assn, 342 F.3d 260 (3rd Cir. 2003); see also
Gaynoe v. First Union Direct Bank, Nat'l Assn., 571 S.E.2d 24 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). For
an interesting analysis of the deceptiveness of Capital One's heavy promotion including its
prolific TV ad campaign, see Complaint, State of Minnesota v. Capital One Bank, available
at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/PRJCapitalOneComplaint.pdf.
67. See, e.g., In re Direct Merchants Credit Card Bank, (Consent Order, Office of the




very minimal68 or nonexistent. 69 A review of several recent solicitations
show some banks disclosing their payment allocation order, but in
smaller print and as a footnote to the Schumer box, in contrast to the
prominence of the promotion for low APRs.
While better payment allocation order disclosure under TILA -
conspicuous enough to counterbalance a prominently promoted low
APR - would be helpful, that is not the fundamental issue. The
essential practice of allocating a consumer's payment to the lowest-rate
balance first is a deceptive and unfair practice. It is an additional
indication that credit card banks have shed any sense of fair play and
good faith customer treatment in their relationships with consumers.
Instead of treating customers with respect and honesty, banks
aggressively mine for profit on every aspect of credit card lending.
These practices do nothing but prolong the debt of consumers and
provide an additional revenue stream for banks.
4. Posting Cut-offs
Card issuers have established cut-off times for posting
payments. Some of these hours have been set ridiculously early,
established deliberately to result in the imposition of late payment fees.
In reported cases, creditors have used times as early 9:00 or 10:00 AM
as the cut-off time for crediting payments received that day.7°
Consequently, if a consumer's payment is received on the payment due
date, it will be considered late because in all likelihood, the U.S. Postal
Service will not have delivered the mail so early in the morning.
Furthermore, when due dates fall on a weekend or holiday, card issuers
68. Broder v. MBNA Corp., 281 A.D.2d 369, 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (promotional
material ambiguously disclosed in small print footnote that card issuer "may" allocate
payments to promotional balances first).
69. See Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank U.S.A., 784 N.Y.S.2d 921 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004) (contending that the bank did not disclose the order of allocation).
70. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Household Bank, 343 F.Supp.2d 1101 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (9
AM cut-off for payment posting); Landreneau v. Fleet Financial Group, 197 F. Supp.2d 551
(M.D. La. 2002) (9 AM cut-off for payment posting); Schwartz v. Citibank (S.D.), Nat'l
Assn, Clearinghouse No. 53,023, Case No. 00-00078 (JWJX) (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2000)
(class action settlement notice in case challenging 10 AM cut-off). At one point, MBNA
supposedly set the cut-off time as early as 6:00 AM. Kevin Hoffman, Lerner's Legacy -
MBNA's Customers Wouldn't Write Such Flattering Obituaries, CLEVELAND SCENE, Dec.
18, 2002, http://www.clevescene.com/issues/ 20 02 -12-18/news/feature.html.
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will consider the payment late if not received on the prior business day.
Non-business day due dates are inherently deceptive.
Requiring issuers to post payments as of the date of receipt,
regardless of time, is a step in the right direction. It is important,
however, to consider this practice in the broader context of a pattern of
unfair behavior by card issuers. Creditors should not be allowed to rig
the system to trap unwary consumers. Consumers need the protections
of a general prohibition against unfair conduct by card issuers, such as
the one contained in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.7
The ability of consumers to enforce section 5 would go a long way
toward curbing abuses, of which posting cut-offs is but one example.
5. Changes to Credit Limits
Another recent abuse is the sudden changes in credit limits
made by card issuers. The Minnesota Attorney General's Office has
documented how Capital One engaged in this practice. In one case, two
days after lowering the consumer's limit and before the consumer had
received any notice of the change, Capital One charged this consumer
an over-limit fee. To pour salt on the wound, Capital One then imposed
a penalty rate.72
6. Debt Collection Abuses
Credit card issuers, like many creditors, have been known to
engage in plain old-fashioned debt collection misconduct - harassment,
deception and abuse. 73  However, there are a few practices that are
unique to credit card companies and their collectors.
Most important is the fact that credit card companies, or the debt
buyers to whom they sell the debt, often initiate collection cases against
consumers without any documentation of a credit card agreement signed
by the consumer or even periodic statements to show transaction
activity. Instead, they simply offer up an affidavit from an employee in
71. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
72. Complaint at 14, State of Minnesota v. Capital One Bank, available at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/PR/CapitalOneComplaint.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Order Granting Motion for Temporary Injunction, State of Minnesota v.
Cross County Bank, No. MC 03-5549 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. Nov. 10, 2004).
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their loss recovery department and/or sue on an account stated theory.
74
This deprives the consumer of the ability to challenge erroneous
transactions or demonstrate how much of their debt is due to purchases
versus finance charges and junk fees.
Indeed, there is evidence that credit card issuers would be
unable to offer up the original agreement or application signed by the
cardholder. In one case, a major card issuer admitted in litigation that it
does not retain the original account application of cardholder's beyond
five years.75 Yet these same issuers may sue the consumer, claiming
that the terms of the now-destroyed documents justify charges, fees, and
the liability of co-signers.
Another practice peculiar to credit card debt is "zombie debt
collection," 76 where card issuers buy old credit card debts, then offer the
debtors new credit cards to revive the old debt. Oftentimes, the debts
are time-barred by the statute of limitations and would constitute stale
information on the consumer's credit report under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.7 7 Of course, the debt-buying card issuers deceptively
omit this critical fact or bury it in fine print. In addition, the debt
buyer/card issuers fail to clearly provide required disclosures as debt
collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.78
7. Use of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
The use of arbitration provisions in credit card agreements has
been a tremendous barrier for consumers seeking redress under the
TILA. Most of the reported cases have been about consumers who have
filed suit as plaintiffs attempting to enforce their rights under the TILA.
Consumers who complain about deceptive TILA disclosures, late
posting of payments, payment allocation abuses, and failure to follow
the Fair Credit Billing Act ("FCBA") procedures have lost their day in
74. Citibank (S.D.) Nat'l Assn. v. Whiteley, 149 S.W.3d 599 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
75. Johnson v. MBNA, 357 F.3d 426,432 (4th Cir. 2004).
76. The term is taken from Liz Pulliam Weston, MSNMoney.com, Zombie Debt
Collectors Dig Up Your Old Mistakes, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Savingand
debt/Managedebt/P74812.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
77. Brink v. First Credit Resources, 185 F.R.D. 567, 569 (D. Ariz. 1999).
78. Carbajal v. Capital One, F.S.B., No. 03 C 1123, 2003 WL 22595265, at *1 (N.D.
111. Nov. 10, 2003) (stating there was a validation notice, but that it was obscured).
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court due to arbitration provisions (added using change-in-terms notices
discussed below).79
Arbitration provisions also burden the ability of consumers to
use the TILA's substantive protections. Mandatory arbitration renders
nugatory the right to dispute erroneous charges because creditors can
ignore consumer disputes and the consumer's only option for relief is an
expensive arbitration proceeding (often conducted by arbitration
providers that are amazingly biased against consumers).8 °
Most shockingly, card issuers are now using arbitration
provisions offensively, as a lopsided method to obtain judgments
against unsuspecting consumers. Some of these consumers include
victims of unauthorized use and identity theft. A report recently issued
by the National Consumer Law Center and Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice documents how credit card debt buyers use arbitration
proceedings to obtain judgments for thousands of dollars against
identity theft victims."
8. Aggressive Solicitation
Many card issuers now make offers of credit based solely on the
credit score. Credit scores measure the propensity to repay and the ratio
of revolving credit used, but they do not measure whether the
consumer's income is adequate to repay a new debt or include a debt-to-
income ratio that would show if the consumer is already overextended.
As a result, card issuers often grant new credit cards to consumers who
are already overextended. Federal regulators have issued guidance
79. See generally, Lawrence v. Household Bank, 343 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1104 (M.D. Ala.2004) (compelling arbitration of TILA and FCBA claims challenging a 9 AM cut-off for
payment posting); see generally Kurz v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 319 F. Supp.2d 457, 460(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (compelling arbitration of FCBA claims as well as retaliation under the
ECOA); cf Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank U.S.A., 784 N.Y.S.2d 921, 2004 WL413213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (compelling arbitration of state law claims challenging
payment allocation abuse); Providian v. Screws, 2003 WL 22272861 (Ala. Oct. 3, 2003)(compelling arbitration of state law claims challenging bait & switch APRs, billing errors,
and late fees).
80. According to documents produced by the National Arbitration Forum itself, the
consumer prevailed in just 87 out of 19,705 arbitrations conducted by NAF for First USABank. Thus, the credit card company prevailed a disturbing 99.56% of the time!




urging card issuers to consider repayment capacity when granting new
credit,8 2 but this guidance is not mandatory or enforceable by injured
consumers. Federal law should prohibit card issuers from issuing credit
cards without first engaging in real underwriting that considers the
consumer's ability to repay the debt.
9. Tiny Minimum Monthly Payments
Creditors have decreased the minimum monthly payments from
four percent to two percent to three percent of the consumer's balance. 3
With lowered monthly minimum payments, consumers who pay only
the minimum will take much longer to pay off the credit card debt and
will pay substantially more in finance charges. Worse, the combination
of the minimum monthly payments and the penalty interest rates often
results in negatively amortizing debt. Even when the consumer is
making the payments as requested and not incurring any new charges,
the debt keeps climbing. While federal guidelines have existed for
some time pushing creditors to increase minimum payments, minimum
payment rates generally stayed well under three percent until very
recently. 4 In the last few months of 2005, largely in response to the
anti-debtor Bankruptcy Reform Act, requiring disclosures relating to the
length of time it will take to repay a debt by making minimum
payments, most issuers have increased minimum payments slightly.
C. Change-in-terms
The expansive change-in-terms provisions in many credit card
agreements are the mechanism that permits card issuers to impose
excessive junk fees and engage in abusive practices. Many issuers
82. OCC ET AL., CREDIT CARD LENDING ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT AND Loss
ALLOWANCE GUIDANCE 2 (Jan. 2003), available at, http://www.federalreserve.gov/Board
Docs/press/bcreg/2003/20030108/attachment.pdf.
83. Sherry, supra note 60.
84. Jane J. Kim, Minimums Due On Credit Cards Are on the Increase, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 24, 2005, at D2. Although federal regulators admit concern over this widespread
practice, new rules addressing the problem have been delayed. See Day & Mayer, supra
note 55.
85. Kathleen Day & Caroline Mayer, Credit Card Feeds, Penalties, Bury Debtors,
WASHINGTON POST, March 6, 2005 at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/ac2/wp-dyn/A1 0361-2005Mar5?language=printer.
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place extremely expansive change-in-term provisions in their credit card
agreements, which allow the issuers to change any of the terms in the
agreement at any time. A typical change-in-terms agreement provides:
We may amend or change any part of your Agreement,
including the periodic rates and other charges, or add or
remove requirements at any time. If we do so, we will
give you notice if required by law of such amendment or
change. Changes to the annual percentage rate(s) will
apply to your account balance from the effective date of
the change, whether or not the account balance included
items billed to the account before the change date and
whether or not you continue to use the account. Changes
to fees and other charges will apply to your account
from the effective date of the change.86
Some states even permit changes in the terms of a credit agreement
without such a clause in the credit agreement. 87
86. Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F.Supp.2d. 189, 191 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
87. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (1999) states:
[A] bank may at any time and from time to time amend [an open-end
credit plan] in any respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject
of the amendment was originally contemplated or addressed by the
parties or is integral to the relationship between the parties. Without
limiting the foregoing, such amendment may change terms by the
addition of new terms or by the deletion or modification of existing
terms, whether relating to plan benefits or features, the rate or rates of
periodic interest, the manner of calculating periodic interest or
outstanding unpaid indebtedness, variable schedules or formulas,
interest charges, fees, collateral requirements, methods for obtaining or
repaying extensions of credit, attorney's fees, plan termination, the
manner for amending the terms of the agreement, arbitration or other
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, or other matters of any kind
whatsoever. Unless the agreement governing a revolving credit plan
otherwise expressly provides, any amendment may, on and after the
date upon which it becomes effective as to a particular borrower.
apply to all then outstanding unpaid indebtedness in the borrower's
account under the plan, including any such indebtedness that arose
prior to the effective date of the amendment. An agreement
governing a revolving credit plan may be amended pursuant to this
section regardless of whether the plan is active or inactive or
whether additional borrowings are available thereunder. Any
amendment that does not increase the rate or rates of periodic
interest charged by a bank to a borrower under § 943 or § 944 of this
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Thus, even when a TILA disclosure shows and the terms of a
credit agreement provide for a fixed APR, the reality is that the creditor
may be able to change the APR in fifteen days with a change-in-terms
notice. 8
There are two problems with these changes in terms notices.
First, these expansive change-in-terms provisions deprive consumers of
any "benefit of bargain" and thus undermine the TILA's purpose in
ensuring effective disclosure. They make a mockery of contract law
because the terms of the "bargain" are illusory. A savvy consumer can
select a credit card after reviewing TILA application and solicitation
disclosures, comparing terms, reading articles about picking a credit
card - in other words, be the smart consumer shopper that the TILA
envisioned - then be faced with a change-in-terms notice that totally
changes the APR and other terms of the credit card. One court has
described change-in-terms provisions as "an Orwellian nightmare,
trapped in agreements that can be amended unilaterally in ways they
never envisioned. 89
Second, the vast majority of consumers probably neither fully
read nor comprehend change-in-terms notices. While not involving
credit cards, the case of Ting v. AT&T, is instructive.90 In that case,
title may become effective as determined by the bank, subject to
compliance by the bank with any applicable notice requirements
under the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 0 1601 et seq.), and the
regulations promulgated thereunder, as in effect from time to time.
Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be included in the
same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of the periodic
statement or in other materials sent to the borrower.
88. Creditors may even attempt to avoid the reach of TILA entirely by using a change-
in-terms tactic. For example, a card issuer could offer a credit card account with a credit
limit over $25,000, thus allegedly qualifying for the exemption for when a "creditor makes a
firm commitment to lend over $25,000" under Official Staff Commentary § 226.3(b)-2.
Then if the creditor subsequently used a change-in-terms notice to decrease the credit limit
to below $25,000, it might argue that it was still exempt. Regardless of any other action the
Board takes on change-of-terms notices, it should amend that section of the Commentary by
adding this proviso: "If the creditor reduces the credit limit to $25,000 or less, the plan is no
longer exempt and the creditor must comply with all of the requirements of the regulation
including, for example, providing the consumer with an initial disclosure statement."
89. Perry v. FleetBoston Financial Corp., No. Civ.A.04-507, 2004 WL 1508518 at *4
n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 6, 2004). This court went on to say that it was "reminded of George
Orwell's 1946 work, Animal Farm, in which the pigs assume power and change the terms of
the animals' social contract, reducing the original Seven Commandments, which included
'All animals are equal,' to one-'All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal
than others."' Id.
90. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9t' Cir. 2003)
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AT&T mailed a consumer services agreement to its customers that,
among other provisions, added a mandatory arbitration clause. Before
mailing this agreement, AT&T conducted extensive market research
designed to predict how consumers would react to the mailing. AT&T
then designed its mailing to ensure that consumers were less likely to
read and understand the details of the agreement.
Furthermore, AT&T's research found that very few customers
actually would read the agreement, especially if it was sent in a separate
mailing. For a mailing separate from a monthly statement, AT&T's
research found that only twenty-five percent of customers were likely to
open the envelope. If the customer did open the envelope, AT&T's
research found that only thirty percent of consumers would read the
entire agreement. 91
The separate mailings for credit card change-in-terms notices
are not any more likely to be opened by consumers. When opened, or
when they are "bill stuffers," they are no more likely to be read. The
market research data uncovered in Ting suggests that the vast majority
of consumers do not read change-in-terms disclosures.
Furthermore, even when consumers do open and read change-
in-terms notices, the notices are full of dense, impenetrable legal jargon
that even lawyers and seasoned consumer advocates have difficulty
understanding. For example, a sample change-in-terms notice states:
Your Daily Periodic Rate and corresponding APR may
increase or decrease from time to time according to the
movements up or down of the Index, which is the
highest Prime Rate published in the "Money Rates"
section of the Midwest Edition of The Wall Street
Journal in the last 90 days, before the date on which the
billing cycle closed (in other words, the "statement
date"). Any variable rate adjustment based on an Index
change will be effective as of the first day of the billing
cycle, and will apply to the new and outstanding
91. An article by Bill Burt at Bankrate.com reports similar data, i.e. a survey byAuriemma Consulting Group finding that only one-third of consumers who received
change-in-terms notices were aware of the changed terms. Bill Burt, Ignoring Credit




Account balances and transactions subject to that
variable rate.
Using the Flesch Reading Ease score built into Microsoft Word,
this text rates at a mere 29.7 out of 100. Generally, the higher score the
better, and standard documents score around sixty to seventy, and
require a twelfth grade reading level to understand.92 In addition, this
particular change-in-terms agreement was written in 4.5-point type, in a
bill stuffer consisting of sixteen folded panels
The fifteen-day notice period is entirely inadequate for a
change-in-terms notice, and is also so full of exceptions that it is nearly
meaningless. The issue, however, is not whether consumers need more
time for a change-in-terms notice, but that changes in terms should not
be permitted at all in credit card contracts. Thus, the Board should seek
legislation banning changes in terms altogether for credit card
agreements.
Furthermore, the Board has the authority under the TILA to
prohibit changes in terms for at least the term of the credit card
agreement. As discussed earlier, changes in terms undermine the TILA
disclosure requirements. The change-in-terms provisions of Regulation
Z exacerbate the problem because they legitimize the practice of
changing terms. In other words, Regulation Z embraces the notion that
"if you disclose it, it's okay." Rather than merely increase the time for
change-of-terms notices, the Board should amend Regulation Z to
provide that for open-end credit other than home equity plans, the
creditor may not change the terms during the term of the credit card: As
such, § 226.9(c)(1) and (2) be replaced with a single paragraph reading:
(1) Any term required to be disclosed under section
226.6 must remain in effect until the renewal disclosures
required by subsection (e). However, the creditor may
change a term if the consumer agrees to the specific
change by signing or initialing a revised agreement or if
92. See also Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 233, 237-38 (2002) (according to National Adult Literacy Survey,
only 3-4% of the American adult population has the documentary literacy skills necessary to
utilize a table comparing the features of two credit cards, so as to identify two differences
between the cards).
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the consumer agreed at the time the credit card was
issued that a specific change would occur on a specific
date or upon the occurrence of a specific event not
within the control of the creditor. If the creditor changes
a term as permitted by this paragraph, it shall mail or
deliver written notice of the change to each consumer
who may be affected, at least 15 days prior to the
effective date of the change. Creditors may not evade
the requirements of this paragraph by issuing credit
cards with terms shorter than twelve months.
This proposal is consistent with the Third Circuit's decision in Rossman
v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) NA. 93 that the Truth in Lending Act requires open-
end credit disclosures to be true and that a disclosure that there is "no
annual fee" must remain true for at least a year.
IV. THE SYSTEM IS BROKEN AND IMPROVED DISCLOSURES WILL NOT
ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS
Because of the deregulation of bank credit, virtually no state
regulation on creditor conduct applies to the practices of the credit card
industry. 94 While there are some - very few - limits placed on the most
outrageous abuses of consumers by banks by the federal banking
regulators, 95 the TILA is the primary regulatory structure applicable to
the relationship between credit card issuers and their customers. The
TILA was intended to be - and remains - primarily a disclosure statute.
Through its enactment and enforcement, Congress intended to enable
consumers to fairly compare the costs of credit.96 However, the TILA
was never intended to stand on its own - to be the sole and primary
means of regulating and limiting a powerful industry vis-d-vis the
individual consumers who borrow money for personal, family or
93. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat'l. Assn, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002).
94. For example, when the state of California tried to address the issue of tiny minimumpayments by requiring creditors to provide information to each consumer on how long it
would take to pay off a sample credit card balance if only the minimum payment was paid
each month, a federal district held the statute was preempted by federal banking statutes.American Bankers Assn. v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp.2d 1000 (E.D. Cal 2002).
95. See supra Section III.B (regarding the handful of enforcement actions taken bybank regulators against subprime credit card lenders).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
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household purposes. Indeed, when the TILA passed in 1968, state
usury and fee caps applied to credit card transactions.
Uniform and accurate disclosures are useful for consumers, but
they cannot substitute for real regulation. The best proof of this is the
unbalanced and dangerous situation that the American consumers find
themselves in with the open-end credit industry today.
Disclosures are only useful for consumers when all of the
following conditions exist -
* The consumer has the opportunity to read the disclosures
fully;
* The disclosures are unambiguous and understandable;
* The disclosures are true and apply to the entire term of the
contract;
* The consumer has the knowledge and sophistication to
understand the meaning of the information provided in the
disclosures;
* The consumer has the opportunity to make choices based on
the information gained through the disclosures.
None of these conditions exist today with regard to open-end
credit. More importantly, even if the Board were to make every
recommended improvement to the TILA disclosures, the most critical of
these conditions would not exist - the consumer would not have the
opportunity to make choices to avoid the onerous and abusive terms of
open-end credit. This is because most large issuers of open-end credit
engage in a reverse competition to provide the most exploitative terms
of credit that will maximize profits, regardless of the effect on the
consumer, the community, or the nation's household debt or rate- of
savings.
Disclosures alone are not sufficient to protect consumers from
over-reaching creditors. This is because -
* Consumers lack equal access to information - most
consumers will not have the knowledge to understand the
legal consequences of the terms of credit.
" Consumers lack equal bargaining power - no consumer has
the market power to call up a credit card company and
2006]
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negotiate either the basic terms or those in the adhesion
contract.
* The credit card market does not provide real choices. With
the increasing consolidation of credit card providers, the
industry guarantees less meaningful competition. There is
generally competition only on the surface, on a few
prominently-advertised terms such as the periodic rate and
annual fee. Consumers have little or no meaningful choices
on the terms that create the bulk of the cost of open-end
credit.
* Without some basic substantive regulation, there will
continue to be competition between industry players only as
to which can garner the most profit from the most
consumers 
- regardless of the fairness, or the effects on
consumers.
As the majority of the questions posed in the Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking by the Board ("ANPR") relate to disclosures,
and ways to improve the disclosures required under the current TILA
statute, these comments provide extensive answers to these questions.
There is no doubt that the disclosures relating to open-end credit can be
dramatically improved - and that the Board should accept these
suggestions. However, the primary message to the Board in these
comments is that disclosures are not sufficient. The Board should
recommend to Congress that it impose substantive regulation of open-
end credit terms and charges.
For the past two decades substantive credit regulation has been
steadily whittled away, with no discernable benefits for consumers. The
twin justifications for this diminution in credit regulation have been that
too much regulation limits access to credit, and that consumers can
adequately protect themselves so long as they are armed with full
information about the costs of the credit. The pendulum has swung too
far - there is no lack of available credit; indeed, for many families there
is far too much credit available.
The current financial condition of many American households
and the escalating credit card debt is an indication that disclosures,
standing alone, do not adequately protect consumers. Even dramatic
improvements to the current disclosure regime required by the TILA
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will not equalize the differences between consumers and industry -
consumers will still lack equal access to information regarding meaning
and consequences and they will still lack sufficient bargaining power to
protect themselves from onerous charges and terms.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM
It is time for the re-regulation of open-end credit.97 Real,
substantive limits on the terms of credit, and the cost of the credit,
including the interest rate and all fees and charges, must be re-imposed.
Substantive regulation along the following lines should ensure-
* A cap on all periodic interest rates, for example, prime plus
10%.
* A cap on all other charges, whether considered a finance
charge or not, to an amount the card issuer can show is
reasonably related to cost.
• No unilateral change-in-terms allowed.
* No retroactive interest rate increases allowed.
* No penalties allowed for behavior not directly linked to the
specific card account at issue.
* No over limit fees allowed if issuer permits credit limit to be
exceeded.
" No improvident extensions of credit - require real
underwriting of the consumer's ability to pay.
* No mandatory arbitration, either for consumers' claims or
for collection actions against consumers.
* Meaningful penalties for violating any substantive or
disclosure rules that provide real incentives to obey the
rules.
* A private right of action to enforce section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive
practices by businesses, including banks.
It is no longer a question of balancing the appropriate regulation
with the need to assure access to credit. The increasing mountain of debt
97. We also advocate the re-regulation of closed end credit. However, as that issue is
not addressed in the Board's ANPR, we will leave that discussion for another day.
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held by American consumers, coupled with the growing number of
abusive practices practiced by the credit card companies, illustrate
amply that de-regulation has not worked. Since biblical times, the
government has recognized that consumers need strong, enforceable
limits placed on the power of lenders to exert their far greater
bargaining power in the marketplace. The age-old protection of
borrowers from over-reaching lenders must be reinstituted.
